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The theoretical contribution of this paper is to regard teachers’ evaluations with a prognostic claim about 
students’ future academic ability as a result of a special social situation in the classroom. We assume that 
after teachers have framed the social situation, particular scripts of action will determine the criteria on 
which  teachers  ground  their  evaluations.  In  concrete  terms,  we  propose  a  theoretical  approach  that 
integrates  existing  meritocratic  and  ‘habitus’  explanations  in  the  comprehensive  framework  of  frame 
selection theory with its important distinction between a more automatic and a more rational type of 
information processing. 
Our empirical contribution is to test the hypotheses that we deduced from our theoretical assumptions in a 
set of structural equation models. Using data from the Cologne High School Panel (CHiSP), we find that 
even when controlling for the path structure of the model, indicators for both kinds of concepts are 
statistically  significant.  However,  regardless  of  the  underlying  type  of  information  processing,  the 
predictive power of indicators operationalizing the meritocratic explanation is comparatively higher. 
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1  Introduction 
In this paper we aim to cover two research questions in the field of educational inequality that 
have been neglected so far: First, the literature seems to agree about the issue that teachers’ 
recommendations  concerning  students’  transition  from  primary  to  secondary  school  are  an 
important dimension of social inequality in educational opportunities in the three-tiered German 
educational system at the secondary level (Becker 2003; Bos and Pietsch 2004; Ditton 2007; 
Pietsch  and  Stubbe  2007).  However,  only  little  is  known  about  whether  there  are  similar 
mechanisms with regard to the transitions from higher secondary school to university. Second, 
rational-choice  explanations  of  educational  inequality  have  put  great  effort  in  modeling  the 
expectations and considerations of both students and their parents (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; 
Esser  1999;  Goldthorpe  1996),  but  theories  of  action  of  teachers’  assessments  have  not 
progressed with similar pace (Ditton 2007). 
This paper’s contribution is to regard teachers’ evaluations about students’ future academic ability 
as a result of a specific social situation in the classroom. In the following theoretical section (section 
2) we will first replicate the general model of sociological explanations as it has been introduced 
by Coleman (1990). Then we will specify the logic of teachers’ definition of the social situation 
when evaluating their students more precisely, and we will try to derive an adequate explanation 
of the formation of these assessments. To be precise, we propose a theoretical approach that 
integrates existing meritocratic and ‘habitus’ explanations in the comprehensive framework of 
frame  selection  theory  with  its  important  distinction  between a  more  automatic  and  a  more 
rational type of information processing (section 2.1). After that we will summarize some well-
known findings of German educational research about predictors of teachers’ recommendations and 
integrate them in our frame selection explanation of teachers’ evaluations (section 2.2). In section 
3, we briefly describe our data, indicators and research design. Since we hypothesize a more Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  2 
 
 
complex path structure for some of our theoretical concepts, we will test our hypotheses via 
structural  equation  modeling  (SEM).  In  section  4,  we  discuss  our  main  findings  from  our 
structural equation models. Most important, students’ average grade is the strongest predictor in 
our models while intelligence comes second. This leads us to the conclusion (section 5) that the 
meritocracy  explanation  of  teachers’  evaluations  –  regardless  of  the  underlying  type  of 
information processing – is empirically more pronounced than the explanation based on habitus 
criteria. However, since we recognized a couple of cross-loadings for potentially habitus-related 
variables, we demand from further studies to develop a more elaborated measurement model of 
both teachers’ and students’ habitus than we were able to analyze with our data. Considering also 
teachers’ backgrounds would then lead to a multilevel structural equation model with teachers’ 
evaluations nested in both student- and teacher-level contexts. 
2  Theory and Hypotheses 
A general model of sociological explanations was given in the seminal book by Coleman (1990) 
wherein he differentiates between macro-level and micro-level propositions as a general form of 
modeling  individual  behavior  in  specific  social  contexts.  The  three-step  procedure  from  the 
macro-level to the micro-level and back to macro-level was extended by Esser (1993, 1996, 1999) 
who labeled the steps as the logic of the situation, the logic of selection, and the logic of aggregation. 
The  logic  of  the  situation  describes  the  top-down  link  from  macro-level  to  micro-level  and 
contains assumptions about both the conditions of the social situation and the alternatives of 
individual  actors.  Expectations  and  evaluations  of  actors  are  linked  to  the  conditions  and 
alternatives of the social situation via bridge hypotheses. 
The  logic  of  selection  aims  to  explain  individual  decisions  on  the  micro-level  based  on  an 
underlying theory of action. If the latter is described explicitly, scholars usually make use of 
rational choice (RC), subjective expected utility (SEU) or frame selection theory (FST). Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  3 
 
 
The logic of aggregation ‘simply’ embodies the bottom-up link between individual behavior on 
the micro-level and the collective explanandum on the macro-level via transformation rules that may 
vary depending on the respective context. Figure 1 displays this general scheme of sociological 
explanations. 
Figure 1 about here 
Subject matter of our investigation is a specific form of teachers’ evaluations concerning their 
students’  abilities  for  academic  studies.  In  concrete  terms,  we  refer  to  teachers’  nominations 
whom of their students they consider to be able to start academic studies and, likewise, whom 
they consider to lack these prerequisites.
1 
For an explanation of the emergence of these particular evaluations a more detailed description 
of  the  social  situation  in  the  classroom  is  fruitful.  Since  teachers’  evaluations  will  of  course 
depend  on  their  respective  expectations  of  students’  prospective  achievement,  our  aim  is  to 
specify the relevant bridge hypotheses that are necessary to link these expectations and evaluations to 
the conditions of the underlying social situation. 
2.1  The Social Situation in the Classroom 
In the literature about teachers’ recommendations, it is assumed that the latter are actually based on 
rational  decisions  and  a  ‘correct’  definition  of  the  situation  in  order  to  guarantee  that  these 
recommendations are somehow optimal for the students (Ditton 2007).
2 In this sense, a ‘correct’ 
                                                 
1 A more detailed description of our data and our dependent variable is given in section three. 
2 Apart from Germany, we only know of the Netherlands as a country where students receive an explicit teacher 
recommendation after primary school with regard to secondary school choice. However, in the Dutch case, teachers’ 
recommendations are strongly influenced by students’ results in a (compulsory) national achievement test (Tolsma et 
al. 2010) – while both criteria were introduced in 1968 (in course of the Mammoth Law) in order to achieve a more 
meritocratic school system (Dronkers 1993). A couple of studies noted that, maybe due to a success of all integrative 
ambitions,  the  effect  of  students’  social  backgrounds  on  teachers’  recommendations  decreased  over  time  (see Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  4 
 
 
definition of the situation should be shaped by the idea of meritocracy and should consider both 
the  actual  achievement  and  the  future  development  possibilities  for  the  students.  This  idea 
legitimizes for the selective function of the educational system. Hence, we should keep in mind 
that when we talk about ‘rational’ recommendations of the teachers, we always imply a kind of 
Weberian ideal type (Weber 1968:19-22) of objectivity and rationality that might (and ideally also 
should)  thoroughly  serve  as  a  frame  for  teachers’  recommendations.  However,  all  actual 
recommendations  will  never  be  more  than  a  subjective  and  thus  more  or  less  imperfect 
realization of this ideal type of rationality. 
In  many  –  not  all  –  German  federal  states  (‘Bundesländer’),  teachers’  recommendations 
concerning  the  transition  from  primary  to  the  three-tiered  secondary  school  (‘Hauptschule’, 
‘Realschule’,  and  ‘Gymnasium’)  are  legally  binding  (for  a  more  detailed  description  of  the 
German educational system see Hillmert and Jacob 2010; Jürges and Schneider 2006; Pietsch and 
Stubbe 2007). Because of the minor permeability between lower and higher education within the 
stratified German school system, there are only small chances to adjust a false (but nonetheless 
binding) recommendation of the teacher or a false parental transition decision during the future 
educational  course  (see  e.g.  Glaesser  and  Cooper  (forthcoming)).  Actually,  teachers’ 
recommendations are more or less valid forecasts of students’ future achievement – potentially 
based  on  both  an  evaluation  of  their  actual  performance  and  additional  information  about 
familial endorsement even spanning students’ prospective educational transitions – and thus have 
far reaching consequences for students’ further life course. 
However, with regard to teachers’ evaluations in our data, which are ­ in contrast to the former ­ 
neither made public to the students nor have a binding character for them, an explanation based 
                                                                                                                                                         
Dronkers 1983 for a review). This might be a reason why no current literature on social inequality concerning the 
formation of teachers’ evaluations in the Dutch school system could be found. As a consequence, we are restricted to 
derive our hypotheses from the German literature. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  5 
 
 
on a too narrow notion of rationality may fall too short. One major reason is that these subjective 
evaluations lack any dependence on structural necessities of the school system ­ meaning that 
teachers’  subjective  assessments  of  students’  academic  ability  will  neither  be  influenced  by 
assumptions about their direct impact on students’ transition decisions nor by outright norms of 
the respective school environment. Thus, we can assume that beyond at first glance intuitively 
rational criteria, teachers might have additional, rather implicit expectations for students with 
different background variables that will explain their explicit evaluations. 
To be sure, we do not claim that teachers’ evaluations are not rational at all. Quite the contrary is 
true: Tentatively, we assume that whenever teachers ground their evaluations on meritocratic 
criteria like students’ academic performance, this would be a rather automatic form of processing, 
therefore a highly efficient coping strategy in terms of Simon’s (1955) notion of bounded rationality.  
At this point, it is fruitful to refer to Esser’s and Kroneberg’s enhancement of Kahnemann and 
Tversky’s (1984) early version of the frame approach towards a general theory of action (Esser 
1996, 2010; Esser and Kroneberg 2010; Kroneberg 2006; Kroneberg et al. 2008; Kroneberg et al. 
2010). The idea behind the frame concept is that in most cases, the actual situation is defined in 
an automatic-spontaneous mode (as-mode), depending on a match of the actor’s perceptions 
with internally stored mental models. The match is determined by (1) the significant symbols of a 
situation, (2) to which extent the latter are perceived and (3) how strongly they are anchored in 
the actor’s mind. Only in cases without such a match a reflecting-calculating definition of the 
situation (rc-mode) is needed. Once a particular situation has been defined, more concrete scripts 
of action reduce the complexity of possible alternatives of actions. Same as the frame-selection, 
the  script-selection  also  varies  between  an  automatic  activation  of  available  scripts,  acquired 
through the process of socialization and depending on both the internalization of norms and the 
habitualization of routines (as-mode) and a rational reflection about the alternatives at hand (rc-Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  6 
 
 
mode). On each level, the match between the social situation and its mental frame determines 
which form of processing is intuitively chosen. If the actor’s definition of a social situation is 
without  any  doubts,  then  the  as-mode  is  the  adequate  since  most  efficient  coping  strategy. 
However, if there is ‘definitional complexity’, a more rational penetration of the social situation 
might be more conducive. 
As regards teachers’ evaluations as they had been surveyed in the Cologne High School Panel 
(CHiSP), the frame of the underlying social situation should be rather unambiguous: the demand 
of an anonymous, non-binding assessment of students’ future academic potential. Thus, teachers 
should recognize the demands of this situation more or less automatically (as-mode). 
Now we have to ask which scripts are at the teachers’ disposal in this situation of a non-binding 
assessment. Our answer  would be that this particular frame requires a script of professional 
pedagogic diagnostics. As already sketched above, we assume that as long as teachers’ evaluations 
are grounded on meritocratic criteria like students’ academic performance; they behave according 
to occupational standards that are deep-rooted in every teacher’s mind. Thus, evaluations which 
are based on meritocratic criteria will emerge rather automatically in line with the as-mode. 
However, though probably most legitimate, these will be not the only criteria which determine 
teachers’ actual evaluations. In total, we will enumerate three different variants of processing that 
might come into play besides meritocracy. 
First, sociologists could learn from Bourdieu’s (1986) theory about different forms of capital that 
the habitus of upper-class students which is defined as a system of dispositions (socially acquired 
schemes of perception, thought and action that are stable over time) perfectly matches with the 
habitus  of  their  teachers  who  usually  originate  from  the  same  social  stratum  and  thus  have 
incorporated a similar system of social dispositions. This positive social discrimination of upper-
class students is twofold: First, upper-class students usually are more familiar with codes (or Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  7 
 
 
routines) that are necessary to acquire the cultural goods that are taught in class. Second, these 
first-order codes depend, in turn, on second-order codes of perception, communication and self-
control strategies that are themselves acquired in socialization and may affect even factors like 
motivation  and  aspiration  (Bourdieu  1986;  Bourdieu  and  Passeron  1990).  Thus,  upper-class 
students with more cultural capital will not only have more knowledge about school-relevant 
contents but they will also be more able to perceive and to communicate according to norms and 
via symbols that come up to the expectations of their teachers (also see Dumais 2006:85f).
3 As 
long as this match of symbolic codes only unconsciously influences teachers in their evaluations, this 
would still be in line with the as-mode of automatic processing. As Kroneberg (2006:18) points 
out, there will be greater activation of an as-mode script Sj  
•  the higher its general availability (aj ∈ [0, 1]), 
•  the higher its accessibility given the selection of frame Fi (aj|I ∈ [0, 1]), and 
•  the higher the match of the selected frame (mi ∈ [0, 1]). 
The availability of a frame describes how strongly it is mentally anchored, and its accessibility 
represents the degree of mental association between frames and scripts. 
In  our  case,  the  as-mode  prevalence  of  habitus  criteria  will  particularly  depend  on  the  script’s 
availability, i.e. “how strongly an actor has internalized certain norms or become[s] accustomed to 
certain routines” (Kroneberg 2006:18). The main point here is that in accordance with the mode 
of automatic processing, actors do not have the opportunity to select between different as-mode 
scripts  deliberately;  instead,  there  is  always  only  one  dominant  as-mode  script  –  whether  it 
approximates more to the ideal type of meritocracy or more to the one of habitus correspondence. 
                                                 
3 Scholars who stress the distinction between primary and secondary effects of social inequality also assume that 
social background variables may lead to a twofold discrimination in the educational system. We will discuss this 
assumption in the following subsection and will try to integrate it in our general theoretical framework. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  8 
 
 
In sum, the first possible deviance from the as-mode meritocracy model would be a more or less 
pronounced (but still unconscious) shift towards the pole of habitus criteria.
4 
Second, however, the degree to which extent teachers’ recurrence on habitus criteria merely follows 
an automatic selection may also vary. Following Hedström (2005), the terms in which Bourdieu 
describes individuals behaving “in habitual ways without consciously reflecting upon what they 
are doing” are like “mental clouds that mystify rather than clarify” – since it is “unclear why he 
believes that habitus, whatever it is, operates  the way it does” (Hedström 2005:4). Likewise, 
Elster  (1985:69-71,  101-108)  criticizes  the  lack  of  any  causal  mechanism  between  people’s 
dispositions and their actual actions. Yaish and Katz-Gerro (forthcoming) rub salt in the same 
wound when they maintain that “[Bourdieu’s] underlying mechanisms remain unspecified and 
open for various interpretations in the theoretical sense” (p. 3). Referring to this openness, in line 
with Elster (1985:70), we could mention a passage in Bourdieu (1986) where the latter explicitly 
brings intentionality back when he argues that distinguishing strategies of members of a social 
class that are genuinely intentional “only ensure full efficacy, by intentional reduplication, for the 
automatic unconscious effects of the dialectic of the rare and the common, the new and the 
dated, which is inscribed in the objective differentiation of class conditions and dispositions” (p. 
246). Likewise, Collet (2009) highlights that although Bourdieu’s actors might to a certain degree 
follow unconscious rules, they cannot be reduced to objects that apply rules automatically in 
terms  of  a  one-dimensional  stimulus-response  behavior.  Since  Yaish  and  Katz-Gerro 
(forthcoming) allude that these two different (we would rather say complementary) interpretations 
                                                 
4 There is some more evidence that allows us to conjoin the notion of ‘habitus’ with theoretical models of situational 
framing: In a theory originally developed for the analysis of school curricula, Bernstein (1971, 1981) differentiates 
between the concept of framing that indicates the strength of the boundary of a social situation, and the concept of 
codes that control the communication between actors. As regards the latter, Bernstein (1971) distinguishes restricted 
codes that work in situations with a great deal of shared and taken-for-granted knowledge from elaborated codes that 
better suit situations with no prior or shared understanding or knowledge. Moreover, despite some differences, 
Bernstein (1990) highlights that “the concept of code bears some relation to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus” (p. 3). 
For a more elaborate discussion about the similarities and differences between Bernstein and Bourdieu see Bourdieu 
(1991:53), Harker and May (1993) as well as Bernstein’s (1995) reply to Harker and May. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  9 
 
 
of the mechanisms that produce behavior are also echoed in dual process theories (p. 3), we see 
the possibility to bridge the gap between the notion of habitus at this stage and a more conscious 
and reflected behavior. To be precise, we argue that in the case of teachers’ evaluations, given an 
assessment of students’ academic performance that tends to follow the as-mode of processing, 
teachers could find rather rational arguments why students with certain social backgrounds might 
be academically more successful than their classmates, because their parents, let’s say having an 
academic background themselves, would be more able to support them. Thus, in that case, the 
dominant script that follows the as-mode framing of the social situation would be a mixture of an 
as-mode  assessment  of  students’  academic  performance  and  of  a  rc-mode  evaluation  of  the 
estimated  impact  of  students’  social  backgrounds  on  their  potential  academic  success  at 
university. 
Third, supplemental to an as-mode assessment of students’ academic performance, teachers might 
refer to additional criteria of students’ general academic ability like their (estimated) intelligence 
or  motivation.  Apart  from  the  most  visible  academic  performance  of  the  students  (usually 
operationalized by their school grades), teachers could find rational reasons for differences in 
ability that might affect students’ success probabilities but are not reflected in grades. Students 
with the same grade might differ in cognitive abilities or in the motivation they invested to 
achieve  this  grade,  and  these  differences  might  also  lead  to  differences  in  their  (estimated) 
probabilities  of  university  success.  Our  main  point  here  is  that  in  contrast  to  the  as-mode 
assessments of students’ academic performance, we assume teachers’ additional considerations 
about students’ ability to be the result of rational reasoning (rc-mode). 
Our  theoretical  considerations  can  be  summed  up  as  follows:  We  assume  that  teachers’ 
evaluations as we find them in our data emerge in a social situation that is framed more or less 
automatically (as-mode) by the teachers. In a second step, teachers’ actual decisions will be formed Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  10 
 
 
according to a specific script of action which may vary between an automatic (as-mode) and a 
rational (rc-mode) pole of information processing. In the most probable script of action, teachers 
intuitively ground their evaluations on students’ actual academic performance (meritocrary-as-mode). 
However, besides this meritocratic criterion, the dominant script may gradually contain three 
other types of information: i) an automatic consideration of students’ backgrounds (habitus-as-
mode), ii) a more rational consideration of students’ backgrounds (habitus-rc-mode), and iii) a rational 
consideration of additional ability criteria apart from students’ actual performance (meritocracy-rc-
mode). Our main point is that on the individual level there is always one dominant script, but 
according  to  our  multidimensional  and  gradual  explanation  of  the  emergence  of  teachers’ 
evaluations, the conditions under which these evaluations are shaped may vary. 
2.2  Determinants of Teachers‘ evaluations 
2.2.1  Academic Performance 
Being perhaps the most visible criterion, the predictive validity of school grades as the most 
common indicator of students’ academic performance is, as several meta-analyses suggest, well-
corroborated (Burton and Ramist 2001; Kuncel et al. 2001; Morgan 1989; Robbins et al. 2004). 
Although  in  Germany  the  value  of  school  grades  for  long-term  recommendations  has  been 
discussed since the 1920s (e.g. Ingenkamp 1971; Ziegenspeck 1999), the average grades given by 
different  teachers  over  a  longer  time  span  are  at  least  a  good  predictor  for  student’s  future 
academic  success  (Trapmann  et  al.  2007).  However,  Arnold  et  al.  (2007:283)  found  that  the 
grades in mathematics and German language together could account for about two thirds of the 
total  variance  of  teachers’  recommendations.  But  since  the  relationship  as  such  is  well- 
established and teachers’ consideration of students’ academic performance can be expected to be Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  11 
 
 
their probably most dominant script of action (meritocracy-as-mode), we transfer this relationship 
onto teachers’ evaluations:  
H1: The better students’ school grades, the higher the probability of obtaining a better evaluation. 
2.2.2  Cognitive Ability 
According to Ingenkamp (1971), in the field of transition from primary to secondary school, test 
results have always been used to compensate for the fallibility of teachers’ assessments.
5 In terms 
of predictive validity, also more recent studies highlight that standardized test scores would be 
more valid indicators than students’ school grades (Camara 1998; Camara and Echternacht 2000; 
Camara et al. 2003). Admittedly, cognitive capabilities can be regarded as the most important 
predictor of school achievement, but a considerable empirical gap between test results and teachers’ 
evaluations can be detected notwithstanding: Arnold et al. (2007:281) found in their investigation 
of German teachers’ recommendations about school transitions that students' competences in 
reading could account for only 31% of the variance of the teachers’ recommendations. 
Nevertheless,  a  linear  relationship  between  intelligence  and  the  probability  of  obtaining  a 
particular teacher’s recommendation to attend "Gymnasium" still holds ­ especially for the verbal 
component  of  intelligence  (Ditton  2007).  And  there  is  evidence  to  assume  that  apart  from 
students’ academic performance, teachers might additionally try to estimate their cognitive ability 
in order to rationally increase the validity of their forecasts (meritocracy-rc-mode) with regard to 
students’ potential academic success at university. Thus we hypothesize:  
H2: The higher students’ intelligence, the higher the probability of obtaining a better evaluation. 
                                                 
5 Moede et al. (1919) and Bobertag and Hylla (1926) can be cited as very early references for the attempt of building 
teacher recommendations about school transition on the ground of standardized test results. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  12 
 
 
2.2.3  Social Backgrounds 
Although the impact of students’ social background variables on their school achievement is 
basically undoubted, both strength and importance of this relationship are still discussed broadly 
(Becker 2003; Becker and Hecken 2009; Blossfeld and Shavit 1993; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; 
Breen and Jonsson 2000; Breen et al. 2009, 2010; Erikson et al. 2005; Goldthorpe 2003; Hillmert 
and Jacob 2010; Schneider 2008; Schubert and Becker 2010; Stocké 2007; Tolsma et al. 2010). In 
general, the literature distinguishes between primary effects of social inequality which denote the 
impact of parental socio-economic status (SES) on differences in students’ academic abilities, and 
secondary effects of social inequality that capture differences (e.g. in educational aspirations) apart 
from actual differences in academic abilities (Boudon 1974). 
As regards primary effects, Arnold et al. (2007:287) could also show that the odds to attend 
Gymnasium is 2.6 times higher for "higher service class" children compared to "working class" 
children  ­  even  after  having  controlled  for  cognitive  abilities  and  reading  competences  (for 
similiar results see: Bos et al. 2004; Jürges and Schneider 2006; Pietsch and Stubbe 2007). These 
results and the mechanisms discussed by the authors mentioned in the last section provide us 
with good reasons to test for the supposition that parental SES might influence their respective 
teachers’ evaluations:  
H3: The higher the socio-economic status (SES) of students’ parents, the higher the probability of obtaining a 
better evaluation. 
As regards secondary effects, scholars have passed some critique in terms of "the inadequacy of 
uni-factorial theories" (Boudon 1974:101). The crucial point of this critique about mere one-
factorial  theories  is  that  secondary  effects  of  social  inequality  are  still  present  after  having 
controlled for all primary effects. That is, regardless of differences in cognitive abilities, "working 




6  Our  assumption  is  that  students’  aspirations  not  only  affect  educational 
transitions but also, previously, the teachers’ evaluations that might thoroughly have an influence 
on the later transition decisions. The claim that this effect takes place independently of academic 
performance,  cognitive  abilities  and  even  parental  SES  implies  that  students’  aspirations 
somehow affect teachers’ internalized norms and habits. We hypothesize that even apart from 
parental SES, students’ aspirations can be subsumed under the general idea of Bourdieu’s (1986) 
habitus  in  terms  of  an  outright  affinity  towards  education  that  matches  the  expectations  and 
norms of the teachers (e.g. about the classical humanistic value of education par se).
7 As we have 
outlined in section 2.1, if teachers have internalized certain norms and habits quite strongly, the 
latter  might  automatically  enter  teachers’  dominant  script  of  action  (habitus-as-mode).  But,  of 
course, following Elster’s (1985) and Hedström’s (2005) interpretation of Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus,  teachers  could  also  find  rather  rational  arguments  why  students  with  certain  social 
backgrounds in general and certain aspirations in particular might do better (habitus-rc-mode). 
Since there is sufficient evidence that students’ habitus might generally be an issue of educational 
inequality (De Graaf and De Graaf 2002; De Graaf et al. 2000; De Graaf 1986; DiMaggio 1982; 
Jæger 2009) our hypothesis reads the following: 
H4: The higher the students’ aspirations, the higher the probability of obtaining a better evaluation. 
                                                 
6 Given education as an investment good (Goldthorpe 1996:494), the chief concern for each family will be to achieve 
some kind of intergenerational stability of class positions. Hence, parents belonging to the service class will be more 
likely than others to encourage their children to attain higher education of some kind (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997). 
Reversely, for families in less advantageous positions not only less ambitious and less costly educational options 
would be adequate for the goal of maintaining class stability ­ but also each failed attempt in obtaining higher 
educational levels is likely to be more serious in its consequences (e.g. in terms of further opportunity costs which 
have to be shouldered). Thus, a higher level of education will be aspired if the educational motivation to continue 
somehow exceeds the underlying investment risk (see also Esser 1999:265-275).  
7 McClelland (1990), Dumais (2002, 2006) and Andres (2009) are examples for studies that use students’ aspirations 
to measure habitus-related components. Dumais (2006) also used students’ habitus to explain a form of teachers’ 
evaluations; however, as she concedes that in her analyses, teachers’ evaluations are merely used as a substitute for 
students’ school grades which have not been measured in her data, we regard our contribution to include both 
students’ grades and teachers’ evaluations in our model. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  14 
 
 
At this point, it is necessary to address a very important distinction in analytical sociology, i.e. the 
one between substantive and empirical statistical models (Cox 1990), or between scientific models 
presented in statistical form and statistical models per se (Rogosa 1987; Sørensen 1998). The point 
is that the former “are intended to represent real processes that have causal force (whether or not 
directly  observable)”  while  the  latter  “are  those  which  sociologists  normally  use  and  are 
concerned with relations among variables that may be determined through techniques of rather 
general applicability” (Goldthorpe 2001:14). In our case, although we consider the dominance of 
as-mode  or  rc-mode  scripts  of  actions  to  be crucially  important  for  the  emergence  of  teachers’ 
evaluations of their students, in the data at hand we have no direct measure to distinguish which 
script mode is actually prevalent and which additional teacher background variables might be able 
to explain that. On the other hand, we also did not want to make theoretical concessions due to 
lack of empirical data. Our aim was to develop a theoretical model as precise as possible, and we 
will  provide  practical  advice  in  the  conclusion  section  how  empirical  analyses  might  further 
proceed. 
3  Research Design 
3.1  Data 
All  analysis  will  be  based  on  a  dataset  which  is  known  as  the  Cologne  High  School  Panel 
(CHiSP).  The  CHiSP  consists  of  an  initial  survey  from  1969  with  N=3385  10th-grade  high 
school (“Gymnasium”) students in North Rhine-Westphalia and two re-surveys in 1985 (N= 
1987) and 1996/97 (N=1596). In the initial survey, students have been asked about issues like 
their performance, interests and plans in school, about their social origin and their relationship to 
their parents. Parallel to the initial survey, the students took part in an Intelligence Structure Test 
(IST) containing four sub-scales as developed by Amthauer (1953). At the same time, also the 
students’ teachers (N=1701) and parents (N=2646) have been surveyed. The main items of the Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  15 
 
 
parent questionnaire covered issues like their social background, their style of raising children and 
their aspirations for their children.
8 
3.2  Variables 
3.2.1  Dependent Variable 
In the CHiSP, teachers have been asked to evaluate by a dichotomous decision which students 
they suppose to be appropriate for academic studies and which of them not. Since this was asked 
as an open-ended question, teachers could classify students as able, as not able - or not at all. 
This data structure causes two problems. First, each student could be evaluated by more than one 
teacher.  An  analysis  of  the  intra-class  correlations  (ICC)  revealed  a  considerable  variance  of 
multiple teachers’ evaluations for each student (not shown, available upon request). Second, the 
openness of the question is not without problems, because it has to be clarified whether the 
‘missing’ category really should be treated technically as a missing value – or if we would lose 
substantial information when proceeding on this assumption. 
To overcome the first problem, our analysis will focus on evaluations only of class teachers.
9 To 
overcome  the  second  problem,  as  a  preliminary  analysis  we  have  estimated  two  logistic 
regressions of the chance of getting a positive evaluation vs. getting a negative, one or none at all, 
respectively,  on  the  same  independent  variables  which  we  will  use  in  structural  equation 
                                                 
8 In the first re-survey in 1985, the at that time approximately 30 year-old former students gave detailed information 
about their private backgrounds and occupational careers beginning at the age of 15 until the age of 30. In the 
second re-survey in 1996/97, the period from the age of 30 until the age of 43 was added to the data. Apart from the 
former students’ life courses, common foci of the questionnaires were items about their biographical self-definition 
and -reflection, causal attribution, centrality of particular areas of life and attitudes towards family, work and politics. 
For a general overview about the existing literature with the CHiSP data up to now see Birkelbach (1998) and 
Meulemann et al. (2001).  
9 We expect that the intra-individual variance of teachers’ evaluations partially depends on the quality of teacher-
student relationships. We assume that class teachers have a more intense relationship to and a better knowledge of 
their students than ‘ordinary’ teachers. Thus, regarding only class teacher evaluations will both simplify the data 
structure and overcome the problem of variance. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  16 
 
 
modeling. These results are displayed in the appendix (tables B and C). We can note that for the 
analysis of the chance of getting a positive evaluation vs. getting none at all (table C), the effect 
sizes of all independent variables are in the same direction, but notably lower than for the analysis 
of the chance of getting a positive evaluation vs. getting a negative one (table B). Thus, we can 
conclude that students who are not mentioned at all rank lower in the teachers’ perceptions than 
students with a good evaluation, but higher than students with a bad evaluation. To get to the 
point: When teachers do not receive clear evidence for their decision, they will develop only 
vague expectations for their students. Thus, in the subsequent structural equation models we will 
treat the "missing" category not as missing but as an implicit middle category between good and 
bad evaluations of the teachers. 
3.2.2  Independent Variables 
First,  students’  intelligence  was  measured  by  their  scores  in  an  Intelligence  Structure  Test 
(Amthauer 1953) consisting of four sub-scales (analogy, selection of words, series of numbers, 
cube test). For the structural equation models we will use the z-transformed scores of these sub-
scales  as  a  measure  for  the  latent  variable  of  students’  intelligence  (reflective  indicators,  see: 
Bollen and Lennox 1991; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; MacCallum and Browne 1993). 
Second, we control for students’ academic performance in terms of their average grades.
10 Third, 
parental socio-economic status (SES) will be operationalized as the maximum value of both mother’s 
and father’s education and occupational prestige. Education was measured in twelve categories 
reaching from 1 ‘without graduation’ to 12 ‘university degree’. We categorized the variable into 
four  dimensions.  Concerning  occupational  prestige,  the  data  already  contain  the  respective 
                                                 
10 Note that according to the German grade system an average grade below the median displays relatively better marks 
and an average grade above the median relatively worse marks. To ensure that a higher variable value denotes better 
marks, we inverted the variable. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  17 
 
 
Treiman prestige scores (Treiman 1977).
11 Finally, students’ aspirations are measured by their 
appraisement whether ‘Abitur’ is necessary to reach their aim in life – if any – (1 ‘necessary’; 2 
‘not necessary, but useful’; 3 ‘not necessary’; 4 ‘no concrete aim in life’). We dichotomized this 
variable into 0 ‘no aim in life / Abitur not necessary’; 1 ‘Abitur useful or necessary’.
12 
3.3  Preliminary Path Structure and Plan of Analysis 
Since we expect that the independent variables will correlate with each other considerably, we 
intend  to  model  intercorrelations  directly  in  our  calculations.  We  expect,  first,  that  students’ 
intelligence  will  be  able  to  explain  part  of  the  variance  of  their  school  grades.  Second,  our 
considerations about the primary effect of social inequality imply that parental SES will influence 
both students’ intelligence and their school grades (Boudon 1974). Third, to consider also the 
secondary  effect  of  social  inequality,  we  assume  an  impact  of  parental  SES  on  students’ 
aspirations. Fourth, it seems reasonable that higher grades will foster students’ aspirations ­ and 
reversely. Therefore, we will allow for a covariance between those two variables. And finally, 
research  about  both  Pygmalion  and  self-fulfilling  prophecies
13 has  shown  that  understanding 
teachers’ evaluations as pure exogenous variables would fall too short. This is why we will model 
the relationship between school grades and teachers’ evaluations and the one between students’ 
                                                 
11 See Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) for a general overview about classification of occupation. Another possibility 
of  dealing  with  parental  SES  would  be  to  model  all  available  information,  i.e.  all  four  variables,  as  formative 
indicators of a latent variable ‘SES’ (Bollen and Lennox 1991; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; MacCallum 
and Browne 1993). However, since the initial survey of the KGP took place in 1969, we have to expect that a 
considerable amount of mothers will be not employed; hence, the variance of this variable would be rather low. 
Indeed, a simple frequency analysis revealed that an amount of 78% of all mothers had not been in labour when they 
have been surveyed (not shown). As a consequence, the factor loadings of a confirmatory factor analysis wherein we 
treated  the  four  SES  variables  as  formative  indicators  were  rather  low  (not  shown).  Thus,  we  conclude  that 
introducing the maximum value of both mothers’ and fathers’ education and occupational prestige as two single 
indicators will be a better strategy that leads to more consistent estimates. 
12 Table A (appendix) contains minimum/maximum, mean and standard deviation of all variables. 
13 For the initial study of Pygmalion in the Classroom see Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968). For early meta-analyses of 
existing studies about Pygmalion up to that point see Smith (1980) and Raudenbush (1984). For a current summary of 
implications and open questions in self-fulfilling prophecy research see Jussim and Harber (2005). Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  18 
 
 
aspirations  and  teachers’  evaluations  as  covariances  rather  than  as  regression  weights.  The 
preliminary path model is presented in figure 2. 
Figure 2 about here 
3.4  Statistical Approach: Structural Equation Modeling 
In order to take the complex path structure of the independent variables into account, we ran a 
set  of  structural  equation  models.
14  Since  our  dependent  variable  is  categorical,  conventional 
maximum  likelihood  estimation  based  on  a  usual  variance-covariance  matrix  will  be  biased 
(Bollen 1989:433ff). Instead, it has been suggested to use a matrix of polychoric correlations 
(Aish and Jöreskog 1990; Jöreskog 1994; Muthén 1984; Olsson 1979) as input matrix.
15 The basic 
idea  of  polychoric  correlations  of  categorical  variables  is  to  compute  the  thresholds  of  an 
assumed underlying continuous variable. To get a comparable metric for all variables, we also 
categorized the ratio-scaled variables in the dataset.
16 For our model we have dichotomized the 
IST  subscores,  students’  average  grade  and  parental  occupational  prestige  based  on  their 
respective median. The polychoric correlation matrix is displayed in table D (appendix). We used 
the SEM package in R (Fox 2006) for our analyses.  
                                                 
14 The SEM approach is also known as a LISREL model (Jöreskog 1993; Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989), named after 
the first statistical package which was able to deal with SEMs. Bollen (1989) is still the classical textbook for structure 
equation models. 
15  Maximum-Likelihood  estimation  of  SEM  models  based  on  polychoric  correlations  may  lead  to  consistent 
estimates, but the standard errors, z-values and significance parameters will be biased (Bollen 1989:443). Therefore, 
we use bootstrapping techniques to correct the latter parameters (Fox 2006; Zhang and Browne 2006). 
16 See Babakus et al. (1987) and Ridgon and Ferguson (1991) for issues of convergence rates and fit statistics of 
polychoric correlations depending on different types of categorization. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  19 
 
 
4   Results 
4.1  Measurement Part 
Following the "Jöreskog tradition" (Byrne 2004) in structural equation modeling, first of all the 
measurement model for the intelligence subscores had to be fitted (figure 3).
17 The reflective 
measurement model for the intelligence scores (IST) achieved a good fit with respect to the 
Adjusted General Fit Index (AGFI=.996), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI=.992), the Root Mean 
Square  Error  of  Approximation  (RMSEA=0.018)  and  the  Standardized  Root  Mean  Square 
Residual (SRMR=0.008).
18 The insignificant χ²-value of 4.226 (df=2) suggests that there is no 
significant difference between the variance-covariance matrix of the observed variables and the 
model we have estimated. Looking at the standardized estimates, we can see that all except one 
IST subdimensions show factor loadings around .45 – .50. Only the cube test seems to perform a 
little bit worse in explaining the latent variable "intelligence".  
Figure 3 about here 
4.2  Structural Part 
The structural part will proceed in three subsequent steps that mainly follow the order of our 
hypotheses in section 2.2: First, teachers’ evaluations are regressed on students’ average grade. 
We label this model, which was deduced according to the meritocracy-as-mode of processing, 
performance model 1. Second, this single-arrow model is amended by the latent intelligence variable 
as  it  has  been  estimated  in  the  IST  measurement  model.  This  model,  which  assumes  the 
meritocracy-rc-mode of processing, is labeled performance model 2. Third, the SES indicators are 
                                                 
17 All regression weights and covariances that are displayed in this and the subsequent structural equation figures 
(figures 3-6) have corresponding z-values that fulfill a significance value of p < .05 or lower (two-tailed). 
18 Bollen (1989) defines the following cut-off values for the goodness-of-fit criteria: AGFI > .95, CFI > .90, and 
both RMSEA and SRMR <.08 (better < 0.05). Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  20 
 
 
introduced to model the primary effects of social inequality (SES model). And finally, also students’ 
aspirations are included in order to model the secondary effects of social inequality (aspiration model). 
According to our theoretical considerations, the indicators for both models may take effect via 
both modes of information processing. 
4.2.1  Performance Models 
 The  Performance  Model  1  simply  regresses  teachers’  evaluations  (1  =  ‘not  able’;  2  =  ‘not 
mentioned’; 3 = ‘able’) on students’ average grade. The standardized covariance of these two 
variables is about .30; and since no measurement model is involved at this point, the fit measures 
of PERF1 are virtually perfect (table 1). Due to the simplicity of the model we see no need for 
graphical illustration.  
Performance Model 2 extends performance model 1 in adding students’ latent intelligence variables 
as  a  second  independent  variable  (table  1,  model  PERF2a).  In  our  theoretical  section,  we 
expected  that  we  might find  stronger  or  additional causal  effects  for  the  verbal  part  of  our 
intelligence test. And indeed, modification indices (see e.g. Sörbom 1989) suggested to allow for a 
direct covariance between the analogy subscore and teachers’ evaluations. Since it does not make 
much  theoretical  sense  to  assume  a cross-sectional  impact  of  teachers’ evaluations  on  students’ 
intelligence
19, we allowed only for a one-way relationship in terms of an impact of intelligence on 
teachers’ evaluations (PERF2b).
20 From table 1, the reader can see that this step clearly improves 
the fit of our model. 
                                                 
19 In contrast,  several studies modeled the Pygmalion effect as a longitudinal impact of  teacher evaluations on 
intelligence (e.g. Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968; the studies analyzed by Smith 1980). Others focused on changes in 
school grades (e.g. Smith et al. 1999). Although we are not directly testing the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis we 
will yet consider its basic idea in terms of a covariance between teachers’ evaluations and school grades. 
20 Jöreskog (1993) strongly recommends only to release parameters which can be interpreted substantively. In this 
case two arguments seem to make sense. Possibly the competence of a student to draw analogy-based inferences is 
more  applicable  (and  thus  also  more  visible  to  teachers)  in  school  lessons  than  the  other  subdimensions  of Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  21 
 
 
Moreover,  first  we  did  not  allow  for  a  covariance  between  intelligence  and  average  grade  – 
although, according to our theoretical considerations, we surely expected it to be there. The fit of 
the constrained model PERF2b was not very satisfactory, and thus we followed our theoretical 
assumptions and allowed for a one-way coefficient of intelligence on average grade. The fit of 
this  model  was  a  bit  better  (model  PERF2c),  but  could  still  be  improved:  Interestingly, 
modification indices also suggested another direct effect of the analogy subscore on students’ 
average grade (which seems to confirm our hypothesis about the particular visibility of this sub-
dimension of intelligence at school). This model, PERF2d, is presented in figure 4.  
Figure 4 about here 
The numbers next to the arrows show the standardized path coefficients, the factor loadings and 
covariances of the model. Similar to our logistic regressions (cf. appendix, tables B and C), the 
covariance between average grade and teachers’ evaluations seems to be much larger than the 
impact of students’ intelligence scores (.40 vs. .20). Controlling also for intelligence now, we note 
that the relationship between intelligence and teachers’ evaluations is mediated by the intervening 
variable  average  grade  (.15).  It  also  seems  noteworthy  that  the  "pure"  effect  of  the  analogy 
subscore on average grade (.10) is again not much smaller than the respective overall regression 
weight of the latent variable intelligence (.15) ­ which is due to a dropdown of the latter from .22 
in  the  restricted  model  PERF2a  without  this  arrow  (not  shown).  The  fit  of  this  model  is 
convincing (cf. table 1, model PERF2d). 
Table 1 about here 
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4.2.2  SES Model 
Now  we  introduce  the  maximum  value  of  both  highest  parental  educational  degree  and 
occupational  prestige  as  two  single  indicators  in  order  to  model  the  primary  effects  of  social 
inequality explicitly. The initial fit of this model is already acceptable (see table 2, model SES1) 
and it could be improved slightly when the covariance between the two SES indicators was 
relaxed  (model  SES2).  Another  improvement  could  be  achieved  when  we  allowed  for  the 
regression weights of the two SES indicators on the latent intelligence variable (model SES3) - 
meaning an operationalization of primary effects of social inequality. Though, in contrast to our 
theoretical model (figure 2), two coefficients in the SES model turned out to lack statistical 
significance: the coefficient of education on the global intelligence variable and the coefficient of 
occupational  prestige  on  teachers’  evaluations.  Therefore,  we  subsequently  dropped  these 
regression  weights  (models  SES4  and  SES5).  Moreover,  modification  indices  suggested  to 
introduce a direct effect of parental education on the analogy subscore of intelligence. Since we 
already found direct effects of this dimension on both average grade and teachers’ evaluations 
(see figure 4), which was in line with our theoretical considerations, we allowed for this regression 
weight (model SES6). While models SES5 and SES6 still contain occupational prestige as a 
covariate  of  education, we  finally  tested  a  model  that  completely  passed  the  former  variable 
(model SES7). This model could achieve a better fit than SES6, and, according to Ockham’s 
razor’s maxime of parsimoniousness, it is the preferred model up to now (see figure 5).
21  
Figure 5 about here 
                                                 
21 We tested three additional variants of models SES6 and SES7 (not shown, available on request): one with a 
regression weight between occupational prestige and average grade (not significant), one with a direct effect of 
education on the latent IST variable rather than on the analogy subscore (significant, but worse model fit), and one 
with  regression  weights  of  average  grade  on  both  the  latent  IST  variable  and  the  analogy  subscore  (which  is 
significant but suffers from multicollinearity). Because of these drawbacks we still prefer model SES7. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  23 
 
 
The direct effect of parental education on teachers’ evaluations is about .10 – which is, up to 
now, the second smallest coefficient in the model. Yet we also have to keep in mind the indirect 
effect in terms of the relationship between education, the IST analogy dimension and teachers’ 
evaluations. The covariance between students’ average grade and teachers’ evaluations is still the 
strongest effect in the model (.40), while the direct impact of intelligence on teachers’ evaluations 
comes second (.26). Again, the effect of the latent intelligence variable on teachers’ evaluations 
slightly increases when controlling for direct and indirect effects of education. Apparently, the 
predictive power of intelligence on teachers’ evaluations becomes even stronger among students 
with the same social background. The model was able to achieve a wholly satisfactory fit (table 3, 
model SES7). 
Table 2 about here 
4.2.3  Aspiration Model 
In  order  to  model  also  the  secondary  effects  of  social  inequality,  we  finally  include  students’ 
aspirations measured by their dummy-coded appraisement if ‘Abitur’ is necessary to reach their 
aim in life. The fit of the initial model without allowing any additional covariances or regression 
weights except the direct effect of students’ aspirations on teachers’ evaluations (table 3, model 
ASP1) could be improved when we allowed for a regression weight of education on students’ 
aspirations  (model  ASP2).  Furthermore,  we  also  assumed  a  direct  effect  of  intelligence  on 
aspirations – which once more upgraded the fit of our model (model ASP3). Next to these 
additional arrows,  we  also  hypothesized a  covariance  between  students’  aspirations  and  their 
average grade. However, in the model including this covariance it turned out to lack statistical 
significance (not shown, available on request). Therefore, ASP3 is already our final model (figure 
6).  Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  24 
 
 
Figure 6 about here 
The  largest  effect  in  our  model  is  still  the  covariance  between  average  grade  and  teachers’ 
evaluations (.39), while the regression weight of the latent intelligence variable comes second 
(.28). The covariance between students’ aspirations and teachers’ evaluations, however, is far 
lower (.08). Aspirations themselves are significantly predicted by parental education (.10) and 
students’ intelligence (.14). Given the size of the final model, its fit is very satisfactory (table 3, 
model ASP3). 
Table 3 about here 
5  Summary and Outlook 
In this paper we tried to model the emergence of teachers’ evaluations with regard to students’ 
academic abilities as an outcome of a specific social situation in the classroom. In the theoretical 
section  we  first  proposed  an  explanation  of  the  emergence  of  teachers’  evaluations  which 
followed Esser’s and Kroneberg’s enhancement of Kahnemann and Tversky’s (1984) general idea 
of  a  framing  approach  (Esser  1996,  2010;  Esser  and  Kroneberg  2010;  Kroneberg  2006; 
Kroneberg et al. 2008; Kroneberg et al. 2010). We assumed that although teachers’ definition of 
the underlying social situation (an anonymous, non-binding assessment of students’ prospective 
academic potential) will surely follow an automatic framing, the subsequent scripts of action they 
will  use  might  vary  between  an  automatic  (as-mode)  and  a  rational  (rc-mode)  ideal  type  of 
information  processing.  In  most  cases,  teachers  will  intuitively  refer  to  students’  actual 
performance when evaluating their students (meritocracy-as-mode). However, the dominant script of 
action  might  be  gradually  shifted  towards  three  other  types  of  information  processing:  i)  an 
automatic  consideration  of  students’  backgrounds  (habitus-as-mode),  ii)  a  more  rational 
consideration  of  students’  backgrounds  (habitus-rc-mode),  and  iii),  a  rational  consideration  of Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  25 
 
 
additional ability criteria apart from students’ actual performance (meritocracy-rc-mode). The crucial 
idea  of  this  explanation  of  teachers’  evaluations  is  that  each  teacher  will  ground  his  or  her 
decision on always one dominant script of action, but the position that this script takes on the as-
mode- vs. rc-mode axis on the one hand and the meritocracy- vs. habitus axis on the other hand may 
vary. 
In a short literature review we then derived four hypotheses, according to which we postulated 
that  teachers’  evaluations  would  be  influenced  by  students’  intelligence, average  grade,  social 
background  and  aspirations,  respectively.  Furthermore,  we  expected  that  some  of  these 
independent variables would show a path structure in terms of additional regression weights or 
covariances between them (Figure 2). 
This model was tested by use of the Cologne High School Panel (CHiSP, 1969). From logistic 
regression analyses (tables B and C; appendix) we could already note that students’ average grade 
seems to have the strongest effect on (positive  or negative) teachers’ evaluations while their 
aspirations come second. Another result of logistic regression analyses was the fact that receiving 
no evaluation at all can be regarded as lying somewhere between obtaining a positive evaluation 
and receiving a negative one. Therefore, for the subsequent structural equation models as our 
main analyses we modeled the decisions of the teachers with regard to the academic ability of 
their students as our dependent variable in the following way: 1 ‘not able’; 2 ‘not mentioned’; 3 
‘able’. 
In  the  structural  equation  models  our  main  hypotheses  were  corroborated.  Even  when 
controlling  for  additional  path  structures,  all  of our  (formally)  independent  variables  showed 
significant effects on teachers’ evaluations. Average grade is still the strongest predictor, but in 
contrast to the preceding logistic regression analyses now students’ intelligence comes second and 
their aspirations come third. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  26 
 
 
Additionally to our main hypothesis H2 we already found evidence in the literature that the 
verbal  dimension  of  intelligence  might  be  more  important  for  teachers’  evaluations  than  the 
numeric  dimension.  Indeed  we  could  note  independent  effects  of  the  analogy  subscore  of 
intelligence on both average grade and teachers’ evaluations – which might be an evidence that 
this dimension at least partially reflects either the meritocracy-rc-mode or even the habitus-as-
mode of processing.
22 But compared to the initial path model we also had to drop several arrows 
due to lack of significance: First we could not find a significant regression weight of parental 
education on the global intelligence variable. However, we could note a significant impact of the 
former on the analogy subscore of intelligence. Since this variable showed independent effects on 
both  average  grade  and  teachers’  evaluations,  we  conclude  that  the  primary  effect  of  social 
inequality is mainly passed on via this predictor. Second, we could not find any direct effects of 
parental occupational prestige on students’ average grade. Apparently, in our socially selective 
sample – recall that our observations are (predominantly upper-class) Gymnasium students –, the 
primary effect of social inequality is exhaustively modeled when we control for the indirect effect 
of parental SES via intelligence on average grade. The third arrow we had to drop concerned the 
regression weight of parental occupational prestige on students’ aspirations. It appears that by 
controlling  for  parental  education,  all  social  background  effects  on  students’  aspirations  are 
already modeled. 
In  sum,  we  can  conclude  that  although  indicators  for  all  four  types  of  theoretical  concepts 
showed statistical significance, we saw that the meritocracy explanation – be it based on rc-mode or 
as-mode scripts – shows more predictive power than the explanation based on habitus criteria. Yet, 
both the empirical dominance of students’ average grade in our models and the fact that the 
                                                 
22 Below we discuss why we see arguments for either mode of processing, and we propose a method how to decide 
which mode of processing may be the actual drive of this arrow. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  27 
 
 
verbal dimension of intelligence showed cross-loadings on average grade as well as on teachers’ 
evaluations might underline the particular importance of the meritocracy-as-mode.  
These results suggest the following implications for further studies: First, the underlying social 
mechanisms  of  the  emergence  of  teachers’  evaluations  have  to  be  further  extended.  Future 
studies  could  try  to  sharpen  the  distinction  between  rc-mode  and  as-mode  processing  type 
explanations as we have transferred on the social situation in the classroom.  
Second, this approach clearly needs the consideration of more background variables. On the one 
hand, the set of student variables in our analyses might be no exhaustive operationalization of the 
student  side  of  the  social  situation  in  the  classroom.  Thus,  it  would  make  sense  to  include 
additional  information  such  as  students’  grades  in  different  subjects  or  their  academic  self-
concept in order to specify the social situation in the classroom more concretely. Moreover, we 
already indicated that although at first sight, it appears reasonable to interpret the cross-loadings 
of the analogy subscore on both students’ academic performance and teachers’ evaluations in line 
with the meritocracy-as-mode of processing, at a second glance, these arrows might also emerge 
by virtue of teachers’ and students’ habitus: Recapitulating our theoretical considerations strictly 
in the latent variable framework, only one of our lower-level concepts intelligence, academic 
performance, parental SES and students aspirations – that were deduced from the higher-level 
concepts ‘meritocracy’ and ‘habitus’, respectively – was actually measured as a latent variable, 
namely students’ intelligence. Thus, both students’ academic performance and their habitus were 
operationalized  by  single  indicators  that  probably  did  not  provide  sufficient  controls  for 
measurement  error.  In  other  words,  students’  objective  academic  performance  should  be 
understood as a latent variable which is only approximately measured by their average grades. 
The latter, in turn, are nothing but the result of a specific form of teachers’ evaluations which 
may themselves be inflated by habitus criteria that operate additionally to the teachers’ meritocracy-Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  28 
 
 
as-mode script of action. We expect that we probably would find additional cross-loadings of both 
the verbal dimension of intelligence and our measure of academic performance on our habitus 
indicators if we could provide a more detailed operationalization of habitus – e.g. in terms of 
students’ cultural capital, their cultural practices, etc. – than we were able to with our data at hand 
(see Kingston (2001) and Lareau and Weininger (2003) for a critical assessment of cultural capital 
usage in educational research). In concrete terms, we demand from further studies to test for a 
second-order factor model (Chen et al. 2005; Rindskopf and Rose 1988) with students’ habitus as 
the higher-level factor, and parental SES, students’ aspirations and their cultural capital as lower-
level factors that should be operationalized by appropriate indicators, respectively.
23 
On the other hand, if one would really want to disentangle the conditions under which teachers’ 
scripts of action tend to follow either the more  automatic or the more  rational information 
processing mode, it will be inevitable also to control for teacher background variables. Future 
studies should try to find variables such as teachers’ pedagogic concepts, their attitudes towards 
educational inequality or measures of teachers’ success attribution that explain why a particular 
teacher follows a certain dominant script of action. Furthermore, teachers’ backgrounds should 
ideally also cover indicators of their habitus: Only if both students’ and teachers’ habitus are 
measured  adequately,  a  final  decision  about  habitus  match  or  mismatch  will  be  possible. 
Methodologically, controlling also for teachers’ backgrounds would equal a multilevel structural 
                                                 
23 DiMaggio (1982) and De Graaf (1986) use explanatory factor analysis to measure families’ cultural capital, but to 
the best of our knowledge, a confirmatory factor model of the notion of habitus in a broader sense is still missing. 
McClelland  (1990),  Dumais  (2002,  2006)  and  Andres  (2009)  measured  habitus  by  students’  aspirations,  but  as 
Dumais (2002:51) herself acknowledges, single-indicator measures for habitus are far from perfect (also see Reay 
2004:440f). Andres (2009) makes use of a path model to test the interrelations between social backgrounds, different 
forms of capital and dispositions, but although claimed in his theoretical section, no analytical operationalization of 
habitus is given in his measurement part. In this attempt, further studies may also refer to the theoretical concepts as 
used by social psychology which offers a whole bunch of literature about the prediction of behavior by attitudes (for 
meta-analyses  see  Glasman  and  Albarracín  2006;  Kim  and  Hunter  1993a,  b;  Kraus  1995;  Wallace  et  al.  2005). 
However, although Acock and Scott (1980) already modeled attitudes as being affected by social class, more recent 
psychological studies apparently neglected this endogeneity. Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  29 
 
 
equation model (Bauer 2003; Heck 2001; Muthén 1994; Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004; Rabe-Hesketh 
et al. 2007) where students (and their evaluations) are nested in teacher contexts. 
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Figures and tables (main text) 
 
Figure 1: General model of sociological explanations. Source: Esser (1993) 




   








Figure 4: Performance Model  Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  34 
 
 
Table 1: Performance Models: Fit Measures 
  PERF1  PERF2a  PERF2b  PERF2c  PERF2d 
χ²  <.001  172.03  138.02  28.015  8.85 
DF  1  10  9  7  6 
p(>χ ²)  1  <.001  <.001  <.001  0.182 
AGFI  1  0.967  0.970  0.992  0.997 
RMSEA  0  0.069  0.065  0.03  0.012 
CFI  1  0.912  0.930  0.989  0.998 
SRMR  0  0.061  0.058  0.018  0.009 




Figure 5: SES Model 
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Table 2: SES Models: Fit Measures 
 
   
  SES1  SES2  SES3  SES4  SES5  SES6  SES7 
χ ²  1563.1  78.17  69.152  69.394  75.486  38.477  22.746 
DF  19  18  16  17  18  17  11 
p(> χ ²)  <.001  <.001  <.001  <.001  <.001  0.002  0.019 
AGFI  0.835  0.989  0.989  0.989  0.989  0.994  0.995 
RMSEA  0.155  0.031  0.031  0.030  0.031  0.019  0.018 
CFI  0.556  0.983  0.985  0.985  0.983  0.994  0.994 
SRMR  0.103  0.026  0.022  0.022  0.023  0.015  0.013 Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  37 
 
 
Figure 6: Aspiration Model 
 
   Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  38 
 
 
Table 3: Aspiration Models: Fit Measures  
 
  ASP1  ASP2  ASP3 
χ²  102.11  70,197  33,417 
DF  28  28  28 
p(>χ²)  <.001  <.001  0.007 
AGFI  0,985  0,989  0,995 
RMSEA  0,037  0,030  0,018 
CFI  0,959  0,974  0,992 
SRMR  0,033  0,028  0,016 Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  39 
 
 
Tables and Figures (Appendix) 
Table A: Descriptive Results 
   
valid  mean  stdev  min  max 
Teachers' evaluations  2427  2.06  0.75  1  3 
 
1 'not able' 
         
 
2 'not mentioned 
         
 
3 'able' 
          Sex 
 
3385  1.47  0.5  1  2 
 
1 'male' 
         
 
2 'female' 
          Intelligence scores (global index)  3230  110.45  11.35  76  151 
Analogy Test 
 
3230  111.66  11.66  77  152 
Analogy test (dichotomized)  3230  0.5  0.5  0  1 
 
0 'below median' 
         
 
1 'above median' 
          Word test 
 
3230  106.39  10.53  70  138 
Word test (dichotomized)  3230  0.48  0.5  0  1 
 
0 'below median' 
         
 
1 'above median' 
          Number test  3230  106.82  10.93  80  147 
Number test (dichotomized)  3230  0.45  0.5  0  1 
 
0 'below median' 
         
 
1 'above median' 
          Cube test 
 
3230  103.21  10.76  73  140 
Cube test (dichotomized)  3230  0.47  0.5  0  1 
 
0 'below median' 
         
 
1 'above median' 
          Average grade  3227  499.98  69.22  221  703 
Average grade (dichotomized)  3227  0.5  0.5  0  1 
 
0 'above median' 
         
 
1 'below median' 
          Parental education (highest)  3374  2.14  1.23  1  4 
 
1 'lower' 
         
 
2 'middle; 
         
 
3' Abitur' 
         
 
4 'degree' 
          Occ. prestige (highest)  2687  49.37  12.63  18  78 
Occ. prestige (highest, dichotomized)  2687  0.47  0.5  0  1 
 
0 'below median' 
         
 
1 'above median' 
          Aspirations 
 
3225  2.92  1.18  1  4 
 
0 'no aim in life / 
Abitur not necessary' 
         
 
1 'Abitur useful or 
necessary' 
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Table B: Logistic Regression: able vs. not able 
 
Performance Model 1  Performance Model 2  SES Model  Aspiration Model 
 
Exp(b/z)  Exp(b/z)  Exp(b/z)  Exp(b/z) 
Constant  1.06  0.57*  0.30***  0.19*** 
 
(0.29)  (-2.41)  (-4.08)  (-5.18) 
Sex  0.77*  0.53***  0.54***  0.58*** 
 
(-2.21)  (-4.51)  (-3.79)  (-3.31) 
Intelligence  3.04***  2.33***  2.84***  2.79*** 
 
(9.52)  (6.13)  (6.60)  (6.43) 
Average grade  12.35***  13.20***  12.93*** 
   
(17.75)  (15.82)  (15.55) 
Parental education 
 
1.19*  1.16 
     
(2.29)  (1.93) 
Parental occ. prestige 
 
1.56*  1.59* 
     
(2.44)  (2.52) 
Aspirations 
     
1.90*** 
       
(3.78) 
Nagelkerke's R²  0.1  0.42  0.46  0.47 
N  1314  1309  1067  1063 
Note: All coefficients are standardized odds ratios. Significance values: * (p < .05); ** (p < .01); *** (p < .001).  
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 Table C: Logistic Regression: able vs. not mentioned 
 
Performance Model 1  Performance Model 2  SES Model  Aspiration Model 
 
Exp(b/z)  Exp(b/z)  Exp(b/z)  Exp(b/z) 
Constant  0.58***  0.28***  0.15***  0.12*** 
 
(-3.30)  (-6.83)  (-8.15)  (-8.20) 
Sex  0.95  0.84  1  1.02 
 
(-0.56)  (-1.60)  (-0.02)  (0.16) 
Intelligence  1.77***  1.56***  1.79***  1.76*** 
 
(5.71)  (4.17)  (4.93)  (4.73) 
Average grade  4.56***  4.72***  4.63*** 
   
(13.41)  (12.27)  (12.10) 
Parental education 
 
1.15*  1.13* 
     
(2.41)  (2.19) 
Parental occ. prestige 
 
1.07  1.08 
     
(0.46)  (0.54) 
Aspirations 
     
1.27 
       
(1.79) 
Nagelkerke's R²  0.03  0.17  0.19  0.19 
N  1720  1716  1412  1406 
Note: All coefficients are standardized odds ratios. Significance values: * (p < .05); ** (p < .01); *** (p < .001). Teachers’ Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom  42 
 
 
















prestige)  aspirations 
teachers' evaluations  1  0.15  0.26  0.17  0.1  0.48  0.12  0.11  0.16 
intelligence: analogy test  0.15  1  0.24  0.23  0.15  0.1  -0.02  0.03  0.07 
intelligence: word test  0.26  0.24  1  0.21  0.16  0.16  0.1  0.07  0.1 
intelligence: number test  0.17  0.23  0.21  1  0.2  0.09  -0.04  0  0.06 
intelligence: cube test  0.1  0.15  0.16  0.2  1  0.07  0.02  0.02  0.03 
average grade  0.48  0.1  0.16  0.09  0.07  1  0.03  0.02  0.07 
max(education)  0.12  -0.02  0.1  -0.04  0.02  0.03  1  0.6  0.1 
max(occ. prestige)  0.11  0.03  0.07  0  0.02  0.02  0.6  1  0.09 
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